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OUR INTUITIONS ABOUT THE 
EXPERIENCE MACHINE
Richard Rowland
elipe De Brigard, Adam Kolber, Wayne Sumner, Dan Weijers, and 
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have argued that our intu-
itions about Nozick’s experience machine are untrustworthy because they 
are distorted by biases and irrelevant factors. De Brigard and Weijers recently 
conducted empirical studies regarding people’s intuitions about versions of the 
experience machine to test which of our intuitions are not distorted by such 
biases and irrelevant factors. They claim their results show that our intuitions 
about the experience machine do not undermine hedonism (section I). I ar-
gue, on the basis of further empirical studies, that De Brigard and Weijers fail to 
establish that our intuitions about the experience machine do not undermine 
hedonism (section II).
Hedonism is the view that the only thing that is noninstrumentally good 
for us or that noninstrumentally improves our well-being is pleasure. Nozick fa-
mously asked us to consider the following thought experiment:
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any expe-
rience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your 
brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or 
making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would 
be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you 
plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life’s experiences?1
Nozick presumed that upon considering the experience machine the vast ma-
jority of people would judge that they should choose to remain in reality rather 
than plug into the machine, and that this gives us strong reason to reject hedo-
nism. And our intuitions about Nozick’s experience machine are widely held to 
give us strong reason to reject hedonism. 
1  Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 42.
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I
De Brigard, Kolber, Sumner, Weijers, and Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that 
our intuitions about Nozick’s experience machine are prone to some of the fol-
lowing misleading factors and biases:
(a) Imaginative resistance to the possibility of such an experience ma-
chine, such as worries that the machine might not work as well as we 
think it does.
(b) The fact that we find it hard to give up responsibility for our loved 
ones in the way that we must if we plug into the experience machine. 
(c) Overactive imaginations overreacting to the scenario and being over-
ly horrified by Nozick’s characterization.
(d) Status quo bias—that is, an inappropriate or irrational preference for 
an option because it preserves the status quo.2
According to these philosophers, the fact that our intuitions about the experi-
ence machine are prone to (a)–(d) directly or indirectly establishes that these 
intuitions do not give us strong reason to reject hedonism.3
This argument is made most strongly and plausibly by De Brigard and Wei-
jers, who each develop versions of the experience machine our intuitions about 
which are supposedly not prone to (a)–(d). Call De Brigard's and Wejiers’s ver-
sions of the experience machine Undistorted Experience Machines. De Brigard 
and Weijers conducted studies of people’s intuitions about Undistorted Experi-
ence Machines and Nozick’s experience machine. They found that, although a 
majority judge that we should choose reality rather than Nozick’s experience 
machine, it is not the case that a majority judge that we should choose reality 
rather than an Undistorted Experience Machine. De Brigard and Weijers conclude 
that this shows that our intuitions about the experience machine do not give us 
strong reason to reject hedonism.
In De Brigard’s Undistorted Experience Machine cases, we are asked to imag-
ine being told by a reliable source that we have been living life inside an experi-
ence machine and are given the chance to unplug to lead a different life in reality. 
De Brigard’s cases are intended to prevent status quo bias from influencing our 
2 See Bostrom and Ord, “The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics.”
3 See De Brigard, “If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?”; Kolber, “Mental Statism and the 
Experience Machine,” 13–16; Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, 21; Weijers, “Intuitive 
Biases in Judgments about Thought Experiments” and “Nozick’s Experience Machine Is 
Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!” 517–19; and Lazari-Radek and Singer, The Point 
of View of the Universe, 254–61.
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anti-experience-machine intuitions.4 But they succeed in this endeavor at the 
cost of rendering pro-experience-machine intuitions prone to status quo bias; 
for in De Brigard’s cases, the status quo is the experience machine.5
Weijers’s Undistorted Experience Machine avoids this problem. In Weijers’s 
Undistorted Experience Machine, we are asked to consider the following case:
A stranger, named Boris, has just found out that he has been regularly 
switched between a real life and a life of machine-generated experiences 
(without ever being aware of the switches); 50% of his life has been spent 
in an Experience Machine and 50% in reality. Nearly all of Boris’ most 
enjoyable experiences occurred while he was in an Experience Machine 
and nearly all of his least enjoyable experiences occurred while he was 
in reality. Boris now has to decide between living the rest of his life in an 
Experience Machine or in reality (no more switching). 
You have had a go in an Experience Machine before and know that 
they provide an unpredictable rollercoaster ride of remarkable experienc-
es. When in the machine, it still felt like you made autonomous decisions 
and occasionally faced tough situations, such as striving for your goals 
and feeling grief, although you didn’t really do these things. Your expe-
riences were also vastly more enjoyable and varied in the machine. You 
also recall that, while you were in the Experience Machine, you had no 
idea that you had gotten into a machine or that your experiences were 
generated by a machine.
Boris’ life will be the same length in an Experience Machine as it 
would in reality. No matter which option Boris chooses, you can be sure 
of two things. First, Boris’ life will be very different from your current life. 
And second, Boris will have no memory of this choice and he will think 
that he is in reality. 
(1) Ignoring how Boris’ family, friends, any other dependents, and soci-
ety in general might be affected, and assuming that Experience Ma-
chines always work perfectly, what is the best thing for Boris to do for 
himself in this situation? Tick only one of these options:
☐ Boris should choose the Experience Machine life.
☐ Boris should choose the real life.  
(2) Briefly explain your choice.6
4 De Brigard, “If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?” 47–50.
5 Weijers, “Nozick’s Experience Machine Is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!” 519.
6 Weijers, “Nozick’s Experience Machine Is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!” 525–26.
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Weijers gave eighty-two subjects his Undistorted Experience Machine. Of those 
eighty-two, 54.5 percent said that Boris should choose the experience machine 
life.7 Weijers also asked seventy-nine subjects about Nozick’s original version of 
the experience machine and found that, in comparison, only 16 percent would 
plug into Nozick’s machine.8 On the basis of this survey data, Weijers concludes 
that our intuitions about the experience machine do not give us strong reason to 
reject hedonism.9 For once we eliminate factors that distort our intuitions about 
the experience machine, a majority of people do not have the intuition that a life 
in reality is better for us than a life in the experience machine.10 
II
In Weijers’s Undistorted Experience Machine, all other things are not held equal 
between the experience machine life and the real life: life in the experience ma-
chine is far more pleasurable and exciting than real life. Given that all things are 
not held equal in Weijers’s case, it is consistent with Weijers’s results that all 54 
percent—or at least a significant proportion of the 54 percent—who responded 
to Weijers’s vignette by saying that Boris should choose the experience machine 
life believe, or are inclined to believe:
Pleasure-Weighted Non-Hedonism: Pleasure is not all that is noninstru-
mentally good for us; other things, such as living a life in reality, are non-
instrumentally good for us too. But a life of great pleasure that is not in 
reality is better for us than a life of far less pleasure in reality because the 
noninstrumental goodness for us of pleasure is greater than the nonin-
strumental goodness for us of any other good.
As I explain, Pleasure-Weighted Non-Hedonism is a plausible view that many peo-
ple hold.
To see the plausibility of Pleasure-Weighted Non-Hedonism, suppose that you 
lead an utterly miserable life of pain and suffering, alone, achieving nothing. You 
know that you cannot escape this life of torment and pain while remaining in 
reality. But you have the ability to plug into an experience machine that will give 
you the immensely enjoyable experience of living a very pleasurable life. We can 
certainly think that living a life in reality is noninstrumentally good for us, but 
that a life in reality in this case is so bad that it would be preferable and better for 
7 Weijers, “Nozick’s Experience Machine Is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!” 527.
8 Weijers, “Nozick’s Experience Machine Is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!” 520.
9 Weijers, “Nozick’s Experience Machine Is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!” 529.
10 Weijers, “Nozick’s Experience Machine Is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!” 528–29.
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us to plug into the experience machine. And some of De Brigard’s experimental 
results favor the view that many hold Pleasure-Weighted Non-Hedonism. For 87 
percent of De Brigard’s participants preferred staying in the experience machine 
to a life full of very little pleasure (in a maximum security prison) but only 50 
percent of people preferred a life in the experience machine to a very pleasurable 
life (as a millionaire in Monaco). The combination of De Brigard’s results favors 
the view that many hold Pleasure-Weighted Non-Hedonism because the view that 
many hold that the goodness for us of pleasure is greater than the goodness for 
us of contact with reality. This can explain why so many more people prefer the 
experience machine to the unpleasant prison life than preferred the experience 
machine life to the pleasurable millionaire life.11
So it seems that if we want to truly test whether people’s intuitions about 
the experience machine count against hedonism, we must investigate their intu-
itions about an Undistorted Experience Machine case in which all things are held 
equal between the two lives we are able, or another is able, to choose. (Many 
other philosophers, including Russ Shafer-Landau in his widely used introduc-
tory text, and prominent hedonists such as Roger Crisp, also focus on versions 
of the experience machine thought experiment in which all things are held equal 
between the experience machine life and the life in reality.)12 I developed such 
an Undistorted Experience Machine and ran an experimental survey using it. 
I recruited eighty-one subjects from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. I 
gave the subjects a variation of Weijers’s vignette in which a life in the experience 
machine was stipulated as being predictably only as enjoyable as a life in reality. I 
gave subjects the following vignette and questions (italics denote changes from 
Weijers’s vignette; these italics were not in the version subjects were given):
A stranger, named Boris, has just found out that he has been regularly 
switched between a real life and a life of machine-generated experiences 
(without ever being aware of the switches); 50% of his life has been spent 
in an Experience Machine and 50% in reality. 50% of Boris’ most enjoyable 
experiences occurred while he was in an Experience Machine and 50% of his 
most enjoyable experiences occurred while he was in reality. Boris now has to 
decide between living the rest of his life in an Experience Machine or in 
reality (no more switching). Living in the Experience Machine rather than 
in reality will not make Boris happier and Boris knows this before making his 
11 De Brigard, “If You Like It, Does It Matter if It’s Real?” 47–49.
12 See Crisp, Reasons and the Good, 118, and Shafer-Landau, The Fundamentals of Ethics, 34–35. 
For a defense of using such an otherwise identical lives version of the Experience Machine, 
see Lin, “How to Use the Experience Machine.”
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choice; if Boris chooses a life outside of an Experience Machine his life will 
be as happy as his life would have been had he chosen a life in an Experience 
Machine. If Boris does not choose one of these two new forms of life he will not 
continue living. Boris must make an active choice between these two new lives. 
And he will not remember having made his choice once he begins his new life.
You have had a go in an Experience Machine before and know that 
they are extraordinarily safe and can provide remarkable experiences. When 
in the machine, it still felt like you made autonomous decisions and occa-
sionally faced tough situations, such as striving for your goals and feeling 
grief, although you didn’t really do these things. You felt that your life, plans, 
relationships, and achievements were real. You also recall that, while you 
were in the Experience Machine, you had no idea that you had gotten into 
a machine or that your experiences were generated by a machine. 
Boris’ life will be the same length in an Experience Machine as it 
would in reality. No matter which option Boris chooses, you can be sure 
of four things. First, Boris’ life will be very different from your current life. 
Second, Boris will have no memory of this choice and he will think that 
he is in reality. Third, the experience machine will not malfunction or break 
when Boris is in it. Fourth, Boris’ life will be as long and happy as it would 
have been had he made the alternative choice.
(1) Ignoring how Boris’ family, friends, any other dependents, and soci-
ety in general might be affected, and assuming that Experience Ma-
chines always work perfectly, what is the best thing for Boris to do for 
himself in this situation? Tick only one of these options:  
☐ Boris should choose the Experience Machine life.
☐ Boris should choose the real life.  
(2) Briefly explain your choice.
Of the eighty-one subjects, seventy-three—more than 90 percent—said that 
Boris should choose the real life; only eight subjects—less than 10 percent—
said that Boris should choose the experience machine life. (Furthermore, seven 
of the eight subjects who said that Boris should choose the experience machine 
life explained their choice in a way that showed that they had either accidentally 
ticked the option that they did not mean to tick or believed that life in the expe-
rience machine would be safer or more pleasurable.)13
13 An anonymous referee points out that a convinced hedonist might want to choose a third 
option that was not offered—namely that it does not matter which life Boris chooses. How-
ever, participants were asked to explain their choice. Of the seventy-three subjects who said 
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So, De Brigard and Weijers are mistaken that experimental data regarding 
our intuitions about the experience machine establish the failure of the argu-
ment against hedonism from our intuitions about the experience machine, since, 
when all other things were held equal, more than 90 percent of subjects judged 
that we should, for the sake of what is good for us, choose a life in reality over a 
life in the experience machine.14 Furthermore, the argument that our intuitions 
about the experience machine do not give us strong reason to reject hedonism 
because our intuitions about the experience machine are subject to distorting bi-
ases seems to fail too. For when all these distorting and biasing factors were mit-
igated and all other things were held equal, the vast majority of people judged 
that we should, for the sake of what is good for us, choose a life in reality over a 
life in the experience machine.15
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